We study adaptive learning in a monetary overlapping generations model with sticky prices and monopolistic competition for the case where learning agents observe current endogenous variables. Observability of current variables is essential for informational consistency of the learning setup with...

This paper demonstrates that the adaptive learning approach to modelling private sector expectations can be used as an equilibrium selection mechanism in a natural-rate monetary model with unemployment persistence. In particular, it is shown that only one of the two rational expectations...

We analyze a class of imitation dynamics with mutations for games with any finite number of actions, and give conditions for the selection of a unique equilibrium as the mutation rate becomes small and the population becomes large. Our results cover the multiple-action extensions of the...

We show that the playing sequence-the order in which players update their actions-is a crucial determinant of whether the best-response dynamic converges to a Nash equilibrium. Specifically, we analyze the probability that the best-response dynamic converges to a pure Nash equilibrium in random...

In a coordination game such as the Battle of the Sexes, agents can condition their plays on external signals that can, in theory, lead to a Correlated Equilibrium that can improve the overall payoffs of the agents. Here we explore whether boundedly rational, adaptive agents can learn to...

Probabilistic equilibrium selection is defined by equipping a set of theoretical solutions with an additive weighting function. In the context of dynamic processes, a weighting function can be constructed by assigning to each theoretical solution a weight equal to the relative size of its basin...

We study the design of mechanisms that implement Lindahl or Walrasian allocations and whose Nash equilibria are dynamically stable for a wide class of adaptive dynamics. We argue that supermodularity is not a desirable stability criterion in this mechanism design context, focusing instead on...

A sunspot variable is any random variable that is not related to fundamental factors of the economy but a potential coordination device. The coordination power of sunspots has been analysed in theory and in experiments. However, some have discussed whether sunspots, e.g., public announcements...

This article analyses the ability of the learning firms in a Cournot oligopoly to discover market solutions more collusive that the Cournot equilibrium (CE). We start from the results of Vallée and Yildizoglu (2009) and of Alos-Ferrer (2004), and qualify the role of random experimenting, social...