A growing body of literature suggests that courts and juries are inclined toward division of liability between two strictly non-negligent or “vigilant” parties. However, standard models of liability rules do not provide for vigilance-based sharing of liability. In this paper, we explore the...

In this paper we discuss a new tort liability rule, which we call super-symmetric comparative negligence and vigilance. When both injurer and victim in an accident are negligent, it provides for liability shares that depend on the degrees of negligence of the two parties, similar to the standard...

A growing body of literature suggests that courts and juries are inclined toward division of liability between two strictly non-negligent or “vigilant” parties. In this paper, we explore the economic efficiency of liability rules based on comparative vigilance. We devise rules that are...

A growing body of literature suggests that courts and juries are inclined toward division of liability between two strictly non-negligent or vigilant parties. However, standard models of liability rules do not provide for vigilance-based sharing of liability. In this paper, we explore the...

This paper modifies the standard tort model by introducing role-type uncertainty, that is, it is assumed that neither party knows in advance whether she will become the victim or the injurer when an accident occurs. When the standards of care of the two parties are assumed to be set at the...