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Patent licensing by means of an auction : internal versus external patentee

Sandonís, Joel; Faulí-Oller, Ramon - In: The Manchester School 76 (2008) 4, pp. 453-463

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003740957

Optimal two-part tariff licensing contracts with fifferentiated goods and endogenous R&D

Faulí-Oller, Ramon; Sandonís, Joel - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003871604

Patent licensing by means of an auction : internal vs. external patentee

Sandonís, Joel (contributor); … - 2007 - 1. ed.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003598207

Welfare reducing licensing

Faulí-Oller, Ramon; Sandonís, Joel - In: Games and economic behavior 41 (2002) 2, pp. 192-205

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001728693

To merge or to license : implications for competition policy

Faulí-Oller, Ramon; Sandonís, Joel - 2000

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001463704

To merge or to license : implications for competition policy

Faulí-Oller, Ramon; Sandonís, Joel - In: International journal of industrial organization 21 (2003) 5, pp. 655-672

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001753006

Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly with increasing marginal costs

Faulí-Oller, Ramon; Sandonís, Joel - In: The Manchester School 90 (2022) 4, pp. 439-452

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013275639

Optimal two-part tariff licensing contracts with differentiated goods and endogenous R&D

Faulí-Oller, Ramon; González Cerdeira, Xulia; … - In: The Manchester School 81 (2013) 5, pp. 803-827

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010190459

To merge or to license

Faulí-Oller, Ramon - 2001

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013423330

Sequential licensing with several competing technologies

Faulí-Oller, Ramon; González Maestre, Miguel - In: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 15 (2024) 2, pp. 179-201

We assume a multistage oligopoly wherein a given number of innovators compete by selling their substitutive technologies. Each innovator sequentially and independently chooses how many licenses to sell, and subsequently, all licensees compete à la Cournot in the product market.We show that, in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015073122