We investigate a model in which a monopoly supplier distributes two types of its product through a traditional retailer with a wholesale price contract and an online retailer with an agency contract. Because such an agency contract eliminates the double marginalization problem, the online...

The paper investigates newsvendor problem for a dyadic supply chain in which both the supplier and the retailer are concerned with fairness. Nash bargaining solution is introduced as the fairness reference point and equilibrium results are derived. The effects of fairness concerns on optimal...

The consensus among academic researchers is that supply chain management lacks grounding theory specific to its field and arguably enough to be recognized as an academic discipline. This paper uses game theoretic, asymmetric Nash bargaining to develop a new theory specific to operations and...

This paper surveys some applications of cooperative game theory to supply chain management. Special emphasis is placed on two important aspects of cooperative games: profit allocation and stability. The paper first describes the construction of the set of feasible outcomes in commonly seen...

Psychologists claim that being treated kindly puts individuals in a positive emotional state: they then treat an unrelated third party more kindly. Numerous experiments document that subjects indeed 'pay forward' specific behavior. For example, they are less generous after having experienced...

The question of how to optimally design an infrastructure network that may be subject to intelligent threats is of highest interest. We address this problem by considering a Designer-Adversary game of optimal network design for the case of imperfect node defense. In this two-stage game, first...

This paper discusses how a manufacturer and its retailers interact with each other to optimize their product marketing strategies, platform product configuration and inventory policies in a VMI (Vendor Managed Inventory) supply chain. The manufacturer procures raw materials from multiple...

Suppliers often make proactive investments in capacity to strategically position themselves to win a contract with a monopolist buyer. Such investments reduce the suppliers' variable costs of serving the buyer's demand. We show that an auction mechanism does not always benefit the...

We consider a two-stage serial supply chain with capacity limits, where each installation is operated by managers attempting to minimize their own costs. A multiple-period model is necessitated by the multiple stages, capacity limits, stochastic demand, and the explicit consideration of...