We consider the problem in which n items arrive to a market sequentially over time, where two agents compete to choose the best possible item. When an agent selects an item, he leaves the market and obtains a payoff given by the value of the item, which is represented by a random variable...

In the traffic assignment problem, commuters select the shortest available path to travel from a given origin to a given destination. This system has been studied for over 50 years since Wardrop's seminal work (1952). Motivated by freight companies, which need to ship goods across the network,...

This article studies a principal-agent problem with discrete outcome and effort space. The principal and the agent are risk neutral and the latter is subject to limited liability. For a given monitoring technology, we consider the maximum possible ratio between the first best social welfare to...

This article studies a principal-agent problem with discrete outcome and effort level spaces. The principal and the agent are risk neutral and the latter is subject to limited liability. We consider the ratio between the first-best social welfare and the social welfare arising from the...

In the traffic assignment problem, commuters select the shortest available path to travel from a given origin to a given destination. This system has been studied for over 50 years since Wardrop's seminal work. Motivated by freight companies, which need to ship goods across the network, we study...