We study the interbank lending and asset sales markets in which banks with surplus liquidity have market power, frictions arise in lending due to moral hazard, and assets are bank-specific. Illiquid banks have weak outside options that allow surplus banks to ration lending, resulting in...

We study liquidity transfers between banks through the interbank borrowing and asset sale markets when, (i) surplus banks providingliquidity have market power, ii) there are frictions in the lendingmarket due to moral hazard, and, (iii) assets are bank-specific. We show that when the outside...

We study liquidity transfers between banks through the interbank borrowing and asset sale markets when(i)surplus banks providing liquidity have market power, ii)there are frictions in the lending market due to moral hazard, and(iii)assets are bank-specific. We show that when the outside options...

We develop a model of financially constrained arbitrage, and use it to study the dynamics of arbitrage capital, liquidity, and asset prices. Arbitrageurs exploit price discrepancies between assets traded in segmented markets, and in doing so provide liquidity to investors. A collateral...

We present a model of financial market liquidity provided by financially constrained intermediaries. We show that market liquidity increases with the level of intermediary capital. We also characterize conditions under which intermediaries play a stabilizing or destabilizing role in markets....