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itself, which performs an anti-corruption task - with the payment of illegal contributions, and provide general conditions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003971532
motive. Using clustered OLS regression with fixed effects and interaction terms, I find that there is in fact a "corruption …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012863070
Firms often try to influence individuals that, like regulators, are tasked with advising or deciding on behalf of a third party. In a dynamic regulatory setting, we show that a firm may prefer to capture regulators through the promise of a lucrative future job opportunity (i.e., the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012491609
We use a unique regulatory event that occurred in Queensland, Australia, from 2007- 2012, to examine the predictive power of landowner relationship networks and lobbying behaviour on successfully gaining value-enhancing rezoning. A State authority, the Urban Land Development Authority (ULDA),...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010516454
corruption where the judicial system is independent, this relationship has more ambiguous effects where the legal system is weak … and susceptible to politicization. These effects remain after controlling for standard determinants of corruption. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010199710
This paper analyzes whether the educational and professional background of a head of government matters for the implementation of market-liberalizing reforms. Employing panel data over the period 1970-2002, we present empirical evidence based on a novel data set covering profession and education...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010285879
Using a model of repeated agency, we explain previously unexplained features of the real-world lobbying industry. Lobbying is divided between direct representation by special interests to policymakers, and indirect representation where special interests employ professional intermediaries called...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011444131
This paper presents a theory of common agency lobbying in which policy-interested lobbies can first influence the choice of a proto-coalition and then influence the legislative bargaining over policy within that coalition. The equilibrium policy in the legislative bargaining stage maximizes the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013087264
Using a model of repeated agency nested in a simple general equilibrium framework, we explain the structure of the lobbying industry. Lobbying is divided between direct representation by special interests to policymakers, and indirect representation where special interests employ professional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013002305
Using a model of repeated agency, we explain previously unexplained features of the real-world lobbying industry. Lobbying is divided between direct representation by special interests to policymakers, and indirect representation where special interests employ professional intermediaries called...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012994576