followed by financial crises. We explain this variation as the outcome of lobbying interests capturing the reform process. Even … by more leveraged entrepreneurs, protecting more established producers. As a result, lobbying may deliberately worsen …

followed by financial crises. We explain this variation as the outcome of lobbying interests capturing the reform process. Even … by more leveraged entrepreneurs, protecting more established producers. As a result, lobbying may deliberately worsen …

followed by financial crises. We explain this variation as the outcome of lobbying interests capturing the reform process. Even … by more leveraged entrepreneurs, protecting more established producers. As a result, lobbying may deliberately worsen …

This paper argues that creditors reflect the financial-safety-net aspect of bank lobbying, plausibly considering the … connection between bank lobbying and government bailouts. Using a structural approach, I show that bank lobbying is negatively …

equilibrium setting, capital requirements and lobbying contributions are determined as the outcome of bargaining between banks and … politicians. We show that bankers and politicians agree on lobbying contributions and capital regulation that renders banks … capital regulation standards from international agreements eliminate lobbying incentives, yielding an efficient and fair …

We study a politician's choice for state or private control of banks. The choice trades of lobbying contributions …

In this paper, we examine the relationship between banks lobbying activities, their size, financial strength, and … larger amounts on lobbying. Finally, we observe that the announcement of the Dodd-Frank bill led to increased lobbying by … banks with higher trading revenues. banking ; lobbying ; financial regulatory reform ; Dodd-Frank bill …