This study explores the manner in which the availability of natural resources wealth, foreign aid or corruption potential constrains institutional improvements. By providing a framework, where rulers, bureaucracy and the citizens act endogenously, we show that the rents from these resources can...

This paper utilizes six-year Senate terms and two-year reporting periods to analyze if Political Action Committees are using their donations to influence the actions of sitting Senators as opposed to simply trying to get those with favorable policy views re-elected. Senators that are early in...

This paper studies how former interest groups’ employees turned politicians (who we label as lobbyist legislators) influence the voting behavior of their colleague legislators. Using the alphabetic allocation of seats in the European Parliament and detailed individual résumé information, we...

A theory is introduced to systematically explain autocracies' diverse experiences with taxation. State power relative to citizens' capacity for violence determines the limit of taxation, the highest tax rate that citizens will tolerate and pay. Rulers can spend resources on coercion to increase...

A standard result in contests is that a higher-ability player has a higher probability of winning the prize than a lower-ability player. Put differently, a stronger player has an advantage over a weaker player in a contest. There are very few exceptions to this standard result. I consider a...

We study the form by which corruption is organized between politicians and entrepreneurs. Using a large-scale survey with data on extra-official payments, and exploiting variation in the gubernatorial office terms and in the market structure across states in Mexico, we examine the manner in...

We use novel hand-collected data on political connections to find politically connected firms earn more positive (less negative) Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) than those without political connections as a response to favorable (unfavorable) macroeconomic news. Using the...

This paper investigates the relationship between the size of interest groups in terms of voter representation and the interest group's campaign contributions to politicians. We uncover a robust hump-shaped relationship between the voting share of an interest group and its contributions to a...

This paper examines the effects of lobbying activities across international borders, on determining each country s import tariff in a multi-principal, multi-agent, menu-auction model. Cross-border political donations could promote international policy cooperation because of two of their...

We explore the role of charitable giving as a means of political influence. For philanthropic foundations associated with large U.S. corporations, we present three different identification strategies that consistently point to the use of corporate social responsibility in ways that parallel the...