Using a model of repeated agency, we explain previously unexplained features of the real-world lobbying industry. Lobbying is divided between direct representation by special interests to policymakers, and indirect representation where special interests employ professional intermediaries called...

Using a model of repeated agency nested in a simple general equilibrium framework, we explain the structure of the lobbying industry. Lobbying is divided between direct representation by special interests to policymakers, and indirect representation where special interests employ professional...

Using a model of repeated agency, we explain previously unexplained features of the real-world lobbying industry. Lobbying is divided between direct representation by special interests to policymakers, and indirect representation where special interests employ professional intermediaries called...

This paper utilizes six-year Senate terms and two-year reporting periods to analyze if Political Action Committees are using their donations to influence the actions of sitting Senators as opposed to simply trying to get those with favorable policy views re-elected. Senators that are early in...

This article discusses the relationship between the identity of the rulers of the executive and reform. Thus, we enrich the literature on the determinants of reform and the result of the executive. This is a new and very important literature, as these are the reforms that allow progress. We use...

A theory is introduced to systematically explain autocracies' diverse experiences with taxation. State power relative to citizens' capacity for violence determines the limit of taxation, the highest tax rate that citizens will tolerate and pay. Rulers can spend resources on coercion to increase...

A firm may induce voters or elected politicians to support a policy it favors by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district whose voters or representatives support the policy. In equilibrium, no one vote may be decisive, and the policy may gain strong support though the majority...

This paper proposes a simultaneous-equation approach to the estimation of the contribution of transport infrastructure accumulation to regional growth. We model explicitly the political-economy process driving infrastructure investments; in doing so, we eliminate a potential source of bias in...

We study lobbying in a setting in which decision-makers share resources in a network. Two opposing interest groups choose which decision-maker they want to target with their resource provision, and their decision depends on the decision-makers' ideologies as well as the network structure. We...