In spatial competition firms are likely to be uncertain about consumer locations when launching products either because of shifting demograph- ics or of asymmetric information about preferences. Realistically distri- butions of consumer locations should be allowed to vary over states and need...

Consider the Hotelling linear spatial duopoly with firm uncertainty over the consumer mean. As uncertainty about the mean grows relative to the dispersion of consumers, competitive locations become socially optimal. A limit result for discontinuous, log-concave densities is also established.

Firms are likely to be uncertain about consumer preferences when launching products. The existing literature models preference uncertainty as an additive shock to the consumer distribution in a characteristic space model. The additive shock only shifts the mean of the consumers' ideal points. We...

We investigate Hotelling’s duopoly game of location-then-price choices with quadratic transportation costs and uniformly distributed consumers under the assumption that firms are uncertain about consumer tastes. When the uncertainty has a uniform distribution on the closed interval <InlineEquation ID="Equ1"> <EquationSource...</equationsource></inlineequation>