In this paper we study the concepts of equilibrium and optimum in static transportation networks with elastic and non-elastic demands. The main mathematical tool of our paper is the theory of variational inequalities. We demonstrate that this theory is useful for proving the existence theorems....

Given a compact connected component of zeros of a vector field, we give a necessary condition for its asymptotic stability in terms of its index and Euler characteristic.

In this paper we prove that for generic (non cooperative) voting games under plurality rule an equilibrium that induces a mixed distribution over the outcomes (i.e. with two or more candidates elected with positive probability) is isolated. From that we deduce also that the set of equilibrium...

In this paper, we prove an existence theorem for equilibria in production economies with increasing returns, which generalizes the classis results on this topic. In partular, we eliminate both the free-disposal assumptions and any smoothness requirements on the boundary of the production sets....

We model the decision problems faced by the members of societies whose new members are determined by vote. We adopt a number of simplifying assumptions. In spite of these simplifications, we show that interesting strategic behavior is implied by the dynamic structure of the problem: the vote for...

Within this framework of pure redistriubtion (dividing one unit of a homogeneous good among identical individuals), the paper analyses the redistributions that arise from Downsian two-party electoral competition. It appears that the strategic behavior of vote-maximizing parties lead them to...

In this paper we consider a labor constrained scheduling problem (LCSP) which is a simplification of a practical problem arising in industry. Jobs are subject to precedence constraints and have specified processing times. Moreover, for each job the labor requirements varies as the job is...

This paper studies the impact of considering the incentives of candidates to strategically affect the outcome of a voting procedure. First we show that every non-dictatorial voting procedure that satisfies unanimity, is open to strategic entry or exit by candidates: there necessarily exists some...

We develop and experiment with new upper bounds for the constrained maximum-entropy sampling problem. Our partition bounds are based on Fischer's inequality. Further new upper bounds combine the use of Fischer's inequality with previously developed bounds.

In the first part of this paper we prove that the global quadratic optimization problem over a simplex can be solved with a constant relative accuracy. In the second part we consider some natural extensions of the result.