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Managing Relational Contracts
Troya-Martinez, Marta - 2018
supplier. Yet in a variety of organizations relationships are overseen by an intermediary such as a manager. Such arrangements … open the door for collusion between the manager and the agent. This paper develops a theory of such managed relational … the agent can help solve the manager's commitment problem. When commitment is difficult, this can result in higher agent …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012937239
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Incentives and Management Styles
Shin, Dongsoo - 2015
downstream task must be done by the worker, but the upstream task can be done by either the manager or the worker. An effort for … the upstream task is a hidden action of the party in charge of the task. The realized project environment is the manager …'s private information. We show that, when the upstream task is easy, the manager may assign the task to herself, even if her …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013025119
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Executive Professionalization and Executive Selection
Raelin, Joseph A. - 2018
Executive management as a distinct occupational category from general management seems to be becoming increasingly professionalized. From a power perspective, CEOs dominate the decision-making apparatus of our major business enterprises. From an attribute approach to professionalization, there...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012922126
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The Managerial Turn in Environmental Policy
Coglianese, Cary - 2012
After several decades’ worth of federal and state regulatory intervention, the quality of the environment in the United States is markedly better today that it was at the founding of the modern environmental era. Nevertheless, environmental regulation remains the target of intense criticism,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014046756
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The Bargain between the Elite and the Majority to Control Politicians and Managers : Party and Managerial Ideologies as Devices to Align Agents
Eastman, Wayne; Collier, Deirdre M. - 2008
How can office-seeking politicians or managers be aligned with social welfare or firm welfare, given that such agents have a suboptimal incentive to cater to majority preferences in situations with low participation costs and to elite preferences in situations with high participation costs? In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014047248
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Governing the purple zone : how politicians influence public managers
Bello, Benedetta; Spano, Alessandro - In: European management journal 33 (2015) 5, pp. 354-365
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011410638
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Trust and contracts: Empirical evidence
D'Acunto, Francesco; Xie, Jin; Yao, Jiaquan - 2022
Trust between parties should drive contract design: if parties were suspicious about each others' reaction to unplanned events, they might agree to pay higher costs of negotiation ex ante to complete contracts. Using a unique sample of U.S. consulting contracts and a negative shock to trust...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013286013
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Delegation and incentives
Bester, Helmut (contributor); Krähmer, Daniel (contributor) - 2006
This paper analyses the relation between authority and incentives. It extends the standard principal-agent model by a project selection stage in which the principal can either delegate the choice of project to the agent or keep the authority. The agent's subsequent choice of effort depends both...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003422618
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Management Cycles
Ishiguro, Shingo - 2018
Why do well-established companies often lose managerial fidelity due to corporate scandals, and how do they restructure management to recover from corporate failures? In this study, we present a dynamic theory of management cycles by which firms endogenously switch between different management...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012907481
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Self-Enforcing Stochastic Monitoring and the Separation of Debt and Equity Claims
Cole, Harold L. - 2013
This paper studies self-enforcing stochastic monitoring in a model of investment and production. The optimal contract leads to debt-like and equity-like claims on the firm which are held by symmetrically informed outside investors, and rationalizes the separation of these claims in order to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013088008