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We study the decisions and performance of managers who are also chair of the board (duality managers). We hypothesize … that duality managers take more risky decisions and deliver worse performance than non-duality managers due to reduced … hypotheses: Duality managers take risk that they could easily avoid, deviate from their benchmarks, make extreme decisions, and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010194852
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012928905
We examine the effect of board members with venture capital experience (i.e., VC directors) on executive incentives at publicly listed firms. VC directors serving on the compensation committee are associated with greater CEO risk-taking incentives (i.e., vega) and greater pay-for-performance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013211007
We examine the effect of board members with venture capital experience (i.e., VC directors) on executive incentives at non-VC-backed public firms. VC directors serving on the compensation committee are associated with greater CEO risk-taking incentives (i.e., vega) and pay-for-performance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013313542
, in the last few years, managers of an increasing number of firms have voluntarily destaggered their boards, exposing … themselves to the risk of being removed from office. This paper investigates why managers decide to destagger their boards. I …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014057586
The effect of severance pay on management behavior during a takeover battle is generally ambiguous. Yet, the severance … still benefits from the increase in the merged firm's total value. Moreover, given that the managers are compensated … according to an identical linear incentive scheme, the optimal shareholder policy always entails a corner solution. Managers …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009491061
Using instrumental variables, we find that having more antitakeover provisions is not only more likely to prevent a bid but also more likely to cause management resistance in the event of not doing so. The deterrent effect is likely to be decreasing in the cost to rival bidders of acquiring...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012864334
principal (target firm shareholders) and agent (target firm managers) are often in conflict. Moreover, the actions and stated … rationale of target managers in resisting or not resisting tender offers are readily observable, and the size of the possible … takeover bid resistance. Tests on a sample of cash tender offers provide support for the managerial welfare hypothesis. The …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014057020
.e. managers' educational attainment and their forecast precision with respect to the firm's future performance. Most important, we … results indicate that the effectiveness of managerial practices depends on managers' ability to implement them …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013226466
This paper examines the new development of hostile takeovers and shareholder activism in Japan. The hostile bidders … claim that the threat of takeover which they pose on the management of a poorly managed company is not only to their benefit … value. Nearly a decade having passed since the first-ever hostile TOB attempt in Japan by M&A Consulting (MAC), an …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013154492