We examine the effect of IFRS on the use of accounting-based performance measures for evaluating and rewarding managers. We show that post-IFRS firms decrease the weight of Earnings-per-Share (EPS) based performance measures in CEO pay contracts. We provide indications that IFRS add “noise”...

We investigate the risk choices of risk averse CEOs. Following recent theoretical work, we expect CEO risk aversion to be more pronounced in firms with high leverage, or high default probability. We find that the CEOs of these firms reduce firm risk, even in the presence of strong risk taking...

This paper provides new evidence on the effect of compensation consultants on CEO pay. We show that the use of a compensation consultant has an increasing effect on the level of total CEO compensation, which is consistent with the “ratcheting up” effect of consultants on CEO pay argued by...

We examine whether UK managers exploited the discretion provided in the UK GAAP to IFRS reconciliation process to manage earnings and whether this earnings management is associated with the structure of the managers' compensation contracts. Using a comprehensive dataset, mainly hand-collected...

This paper investigates the motives for disclosing an alternative Earnings per Share (EPS) figure. In particular, we extend prior findings for the UK (Choi, Lin, Walker & Young, 2007) by highlighting the role of managerial contracting in the alternative EPS disclosure choice. We examine a...

CEOs with substantial short-term monetary incentives behave myopically out of concerns for the stock price. One potential target for managerial myopia is corporate tax avoidance. We show that, ceteris paribus, CEO short-term monetary incentives are associated with declines in cash effective tax...

This paper investigates the relationship between a CEO’s social network, firm identity, and firm performance. There are two competing theories that predict contradictory outcomes. Following social network theory, one would expect a positive relation between social networks and firm...

The Split Share Structure Reform in China enables state shareholders of listed firms to trade their restricted shares. This renders the wealth of state shareholders more related to share price movements. We predict this reform will create remuneration arrangements that increase the relationship...