While previous research has suggested the coincidence of CEO turnover and real changes in firm operations such as discontinued operations, we demonstrate that such findings apply only to specific types of CEO turnover, and only if other top executives also exit the firm. Categorizing specific...

Risk-neutral individuals take more risky decisions when they have limited liability.  Risk-neutral managers may not when acting as agents under contract and taking costly actions to acquire informatin before taking decisions.  Limited liability makes it optimal to increase the reward for...

We study the optimal dynamics of incentives for a manager whose ability to generate cash .ows changes stochastically with time and is his private information. We show that, in general, the power of incentives (or "pay for performance") may either increase or decrease with tenure. However, risk...

This paper discusses the design and analyzes the potential benefits and costs of executive pay package policy within the US 2009 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA), commonly known "Bailout". It shows that the ultimate effect of the EESA on executive compensation is generally difficult...

CEO remuneration is contentious and so we applaud Jacquart and Armstrong's (2013) systematic evidence-based review. We augment their analysis in two ways. First, we highlight the lack of demonstrated validity of “unaided expert judgment” to set CEO remuneration by pointing out that the...

The best worker is not always the best candidate for manager. In these cases, do firms promote the best potential manager or the best worker in her current job? Using microdata on the performance of sales workers at 131 firms, we find evidence consistent with the Peter Principle, which proposes...

This study examines the integration of corporate social responsibility (CSR) criteria in executive compensation, a relatively recent practice in corporate governance. We construct a novel database of CSR contracting and document that CSR contracting has become more prevalent over time. We...

We investigate whether differences in management explain variation in productivity and whether different labor market policies can impact the allocation of managerial effectiveness. Using data on the universe of students and school personnel in Chile, we establish three main findings. First,...

We critically review the emerging literature in Organizational and Personnel Economics concerning the role of managers and management practices. Our focus is on the middle managers who populate the hierarchies between top executives and front-line employees. We are especially concerned with...

In recent decades, most developed countries have experienced a simultaneous increase in income inequality and management compensation. In this paper, we study the relation between management compensation and firm-level income dynamics in a general equilibrium model. Empirical estimation, of the...