We develop a model in which the heterogeneous firms in an industry choose their modes of organization and the location of their subsidiaries or suppliers. We assume that the principals of a firm are constrained in the nature of the contracts they can write with suppliers or employees. Our main...

How can office-seeking politicians or managers be aligned with social welfare or firm welfare, given that such agents have a suboptimal incentive to cater to majority preferences in situations with low participation costs and to elite preferences in situations with high participation costs? In...

This article, from The Oxford Handbook of Dynamic Capabilities (David J. Teece & Sohvi Leih, eds. 2016), describes the construct of “legal astuteness” and explains why it is a valuable dynamic capability. It also examines the systems approach to law and strategy, which embeds the top...

This article addressed one of the hardest unanswered legal questions facing the modern nonprofit corporation: How much discretion should nonprofit boards have to redefine an organization's mission - for instance by changing an acute care hospital into outpatient neighborhood clinics, or by...

The recent seminal work of Gabaix (2011) raises a puzzling question: If centralization-putting different projects under the same roof-reduces diversification for investors, how does this situation reconcile with the seemingly contradictory fact that it also boosts a firm's borrowing capacity? To...

We find a significant hump-shaped relation between firm valuation and CEO ownership when external governance (EG) is weak, but the relation is insignificant when EG is strong. These interactive effects are identified while controlling for firm-fixed effects. The results imply that CEO ownership...

We use a unique dataset of more than 1,000 Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and Chief Financial Officers around the world to investigate the degree to which executives delegate financial decisions and the circumstances that drive variation in delegation. Delegation does not appear to be...

We examine the board composition and the role of outside directors in U.S. private firms. We find that compared with public firms, private firms have a higher proportion of outside directors on the boards and select their outside directors in a more responsive way to their advisory and...

Using hand-collected data on chief executive officer (CEO) non-compete agreements (NCAs), we find that NCAs are less likely when CEOs expect to incur greater personal costs from reduced job mobility and more likely when firms expect to suffer greater economic harm if departing CEOs work for...

The study investigates the evolution of CEO pay after the implementation of new disclosure rules in France. It opposes a managerial labor market view in which firms compete for CEO talent, and a governance institutions view that embraces managerial power, outrage constraint, and agency issues....