We investigate how CEO's risk incentive (vega) affects firm innovation. To establish causality, we exploit compensation changes instigated by the FAS 123R accounting regulation in 2005 that mandated stock option expensing at fair values. Our identification tests indicate a positive and causal...

Company executives rely on new product development teams to carry out their directives and make decisions according to management’s goals and objectives. However, new product team members bring their own motivational perspectives to strategic decisions. This research examines how individual...

Agents often wish to limit the price they pay for an asset. If they are acquiring a large number of shares, they must balance the risk of trading slowly (to limit price impact) with the risk of future uncertainty in prices. Here, we address the optimal acquisition problem for an agent who is...

We establish that CEOs of companies experiencing volatile industry conditions are more likely to be dismissed. At the same time, industry risk is, accounting for various other factors, unlikely to be associated with CEO compensation other than through dismissal risk. Using this identification...