This paper analyses the perceptions of managers on dividend policy by surveying the views of 125 Managers of 66 companies listed at Nepal Stock Exchange. This survey is motivated by the observation that much of dividend policy theory is implicitly based on a capital market perspective. Out of 66...

The personal traits of chief executive officers (CEOs) have been found to influence corporate policy decisions. We examine the impact of past professional distress experiences on payout policy. We hypothesize that CEOs experiencing a distress event in their past career, before becoming CEO,...

We study whether CEO political ideology affected how S&P 500 firms reacted to the Covid-19 pandemic, an exogenous shock to demand and supply. We hypothesize that conservative CEOs are more likely to adopt shareholder-friendly than employee-friendly reactions to the pandemic. Hence, they should...

We develop a theory of income and payout smoothing by firms when insiders know more about income than outside shareholders, but property rights ensure that outsiders can enforce a fair payout. Insiders set payout to meet outsiders' expectations and underproduce to manage future expectations...

This research paper examines the corporate dividend payout behaviours of non-financial firms from Istanbul Stock Exchange (Borsa Istanbul). Survey method is conducted to investigate managerial views on corporate dividend policy. The study investigates whether the evidence in Turkish stock market...

We consider a setting in which insiders have information about income that outside shareholders do not, but property rights ensure that outside shareholders can enforce a fair payout. To avoid intervention, insiders report income consistent with outsiders' expectations based on publicly...

We develop a theory of income and payout smoothing by firms when insiders know more about income than outside shareholders, but property rights ensure that outsiders can enforce a fair payout. Insiders set payout to meet outsiders' expectations and underproduce to manage downward future...

Baker (2002) has demonstrated theoretically that the quality of performance measures used in compensation contracts hinges on two characteristics: noise and distortion. These criteria, though, will only be useful in practice as long as the noise and distortion of a performance measure can be...

We study a principal-agent setting in which both sides learn about future profitability from output, and the project can be abandoned/terminated if profitability is too low. With learning, shirking by the agent both reduces output and lowers the principal's estimate of future profitability. The...