This paper surveys the recent literature on CEO compensation. The rapid rise in CEO pay over the past 30 years has sparked an intense debate about the nature of the pay-setting process. Many view the high level of CEO compensation as the result of powerful managers setting their own pay. Others...

We use a laboratory experiment to investigate the extent to which leaders---faced with opportunistic incentives---employ monitoring to improve team production. Participants are assigned to teams, with one person appointed as the leader. The leader has the power to commit to a monitoring option,...

This paper surveys the recent literature on CEO compensation. The rapid rise in CEO pay over the past 30 years has sparked an intense debate about the nature of the pay-setting process. Many view the high level of CEO compensation as the result of powerful managers setting their own pay. Others...

This paper surveys the recent literature on CEO compensation. The rapid rise in CEO pay over the past 30 years has sparked an intense debate about the nature of the pay-setting process. Many view the high level of CEO compensation as the result of powerful managers setting their own pay. Others...

Clawback provisions entitle shareholders to recover previously-awarded incentive compensation from managers involved in accounting manipulation or misconduct. I study theoretically and empirically the impact of clawback provisions on the horizon of executive pay when shareholders face clawback...

We provide empirical tests to evaluate the impact of clawback enforcement heterogeneity on the horizon of executive compensation. Clawback provisions entitle shareholders to recover previously-awarded incentive compensation after the discovery of accounting manipulation or misconduct. We deal...

Risk-neutral individuals take more risky decisions when they have limited liability.  Risk-neutral managers may not when acting as agents under contract and taking costly actions to acquire informatin before taking decisions.  Limited liability makes it optimal to increase the reward for...

Following Oyer (2004) and Rajgopal, Shevlin and Zamora (2006), we provide evidence that the level of stock option compensation results from outside opportunities in the managerial labor market for a sample of 3,214 CEO-year observations from S&P1500 companies between 1996 and 2010. We argue that...

Prior economic research is very critical about family CEOs and family management. Nepotism, altruism, lower managerial abilities, and a small pool of qualified family candidates are cited as reasons that speak against family management. Still, the empirical reality is different. A surprisingly...

This paper investigates the factors that make teams successful in competitive environments. In collaboration with a medium-sized Latin-American bank, we designed a series of contests among the branches of the bank, in which we varied the prize structure of the tournaments (in some tournaments,...