Showing 1 - 8 of 8
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012666242
We show how CEO ownership and the market for corporate control interact to influence the investment-timing decisions of empire-building CEOs. The prospect of a future takeover means that CEOs with no ownership stake will over-invest in some types of projects and under-invest in others, but these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012835406
This note describes how meaningful measures of executive compensation can be extracted from the proxy statements that firms send to shareholders each year. It shows where the information needed to calculate such measures can be found and why the most informative measures of executive pay differ...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012953474
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012821617
This paper presents a model of a firm that backdates the granting of executive stock options in order to maximize actual compensation for a given level of reported compensation. The model is used to estimate the magnitude of the difference between the actual and reported values of option grants....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012857024
This paper presents a new model of CEO turnover that includes outside employment and retirement options. The board and the CEO use firm performance to update their beliefs about the CEO's ability. If the CEO's perceived ability falls below an endogenously determined threshold, the board fires...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013322541
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012521045
This paper presents a real-options model of entrenchment in which a CEO chooses how much effort to put into boosting a firm's productivity and the board and CEO bargain over executive-compensation and investment policies. The surplus that bargaining allocates derives from the reduction in value...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014352326