This study examines the determinants of CEO compensation using data from a nationally representative sample of privately held U.S. corporations. We find that (i) the pay-size elasticity is much larger for privately held firms than for the publicly traded firms on which previous research has...

We examine executive compensation using data from two nationally representative samples of small privately held U.S. corporations conducted ten years apart — in 1993 and 2003. We find that executive pay at small privately held firms increases with firm size and varies widely by industry,...

This study examines the determinants of CEO compensation using data from a nationally representative sample of non-publicly traded corporations. We find that CEO compensation is higher at C corporations than at S corporations, consistent with view that CEOs of small firms can reduce the effect...

We provide measures of absolute and relative equity agency costs for corporations under different ownership and management structures. Our base case is Jensen and Meckling's (1976) zero agency-cost firm, where the manager is the firm's sole shareholder. We utilize a sample of 1,708 small...

This study examines the determinants of executive compensation using data from two nationally representative samples of privately held U.S. corporations conducted ten years apart-in 1993 and 2003 — and uses these data to test a number of hypotheses. We find that: (i) the level of executive pay...