This study examines how manager's power affects capital expenditure in conglomerates, and how the firm's corporate governance mitigates the influence of subsidiary managers' informal power on capital expenditure. We conducted an empirical study using Taiwanese Business Group data, which includes...

This study explores whether there is excessive executive compensation in family firms and also examines the effects of top management power and institutional investors on excessive executive compensation. Based on 3,927 Taiwan-listed companies from 2008 to 2012, the empirical results show that:...

There has been a widespread public attention and academic interest on family ownerships in emerging Asian countries. Although family ownerships can lead to direct and effective monitoring of managerial discretion and lower principal-agent costs, they also want to increase corporate performance....

Agency theory argues that pay-performance sensitivity should be negatively associated with risk. Yet, empirical studies have reported mixed findings on this relationship, which may be attributable to such confounding factors as different levels of delegation and monitoring costs. Extending prior...

This study reports that changes in compensation from performance-sensitive (commission-based) to less performance-sensitive (base salary plus commission) schemes hurt employee performance but do not impair the company's. We analyzed performance data for 4,392 employees and 87 branches of a major...