We study how plan sponsors choose investment management firms from their opportunity set when delegating $1.6 trillion in assets between 2002 and 2017. Two factors play an influential role in choice: pre-hiring returns, and pre-existing personal connections between personnel at the plan (or...

More than half of S&P 500 CEOs receive options annually, however extant valuation models have not accounted for portfolio considerations. We show the inability of executives to diversify means portfolio effects matter: exercise thresholds and shareholder costs are lower than for stand-alone...

We examine the role of peer (e.g., Lipper indices) vs. pure (i.e., market indices) benchmarks in the compensation contract of mutual fund managers. We first model the impact of peer vs. pure benchmarks on fund manager incentives. Then, using a unique hand-collected dataset, we test the...

We develop a model of managerial compensation structure and asset risk choice. The model provides predictions about how inside debt features affect the relation between credit spreads and compensation components. First, inside debt reduces credit spreads only if it is unsecured. Second, inside...

On theoretical grounds, monitoring of top executives by the (supervisory) board is expected to be value relevant. The empirical evidence is ambiguous and we analyze three non-competing explanations for this ambiguity: (i) The positive effect on firm value of board monitoring is hidden in stock...

We argue gender-diverse boards are associated with distinct preferences that reassure investors about their commitment to moderate risk and boost long-term corporate survival. Results suggest a strong relation between gender-diverse boards and bondholder-aligned CEO compensation components,...

On theoretical grounds, monitoring of top executives by the (supervisory) board is expected to be value relevant. The empirical evidence is ambiguous and we analyze three non-competing explanations for this ambiguity: (i) The positive effect on firm value of board monitoring is hidden in stock...

This paper shows that it is profitable for a firm to hire an overoptimistic manager to commit to a certain investment strategy in an R&D tournament situation. In the unique symmetric equilibrium, all firms delegate to overoptimistic managers, where the optimal degree of overoptimism depends on...

Cash contributions to defined benefit pension (DB) plans reduce cash flows from operations without directly affecting the current year's net income. We utilize this unique setting to investigate how managerial incentives to report higher cash flows from operations, executive compensation in...

This study investigates how six different measures of firm performance affect executive compensation in Nigerian insurance sector (2011-2016). The Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS) and Kao Residual tests were employed to ascertain stationarity and cointegration of the variables. Mixed stationary and no...