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Standard principal-agent theory predicts that large firms should not use employee stock options and other stock …-based compensation to provide incentives to non-executive employees. Yet, business practitioners appear to believe that stock …-based compensation improves incentives, and mounting empirical evidence points to the same conclusion. This paper provides an explanation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010362951
The two major paradigmsin the theoretical agency literature aremoral hazard (i.e., hidden action)and adverseselection (i.e., hiddeninformation). Prior research typically solves these problemsin isolation, as opposed to simultaneouslyincorporating both adverseselection and moral hazard features....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013116385
We show that long-term compensation is associated with higher pay in the financial industry and the legal sector. Then …, using a detailed survey of law school graduates, we explore why firms use long-term compensation. We find that individuals … employer to tasks that are self-enhancing are more likely to receive long-term compensation, especially in markets with high …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013064773
For the past 30 years, the conventional wisdom has been that executive compensation packages should include very large … executive compensation simply take it as a given. We argue, however, that in light of evolving corporate governance mechanisms … compensation context. In addition to the stickiness of that status quo, incentive pay's staying power has been supported by private …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013068058
Clawbacks are contractual provisions in executive compensation contracts that allow for an ex post recoupment of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012833330
While numerous studies have examined the impact that powerful CEOs have on their compensation and overall firm … decisions, relatively little is known about how powerful CFOs influence their compensation and important firm financial … process of a firm. Using managerial power theory (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003) and the theory of power and self-focus (Pitesa and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012974079
We explore the determinants of compensation gaps between a firm's CEO and its other top executives, and compare the … ability of two competing optimal contracting theories, namely tournament theory and productivity theory, to explain the cross … sectional variability in these gaps across firms. We find little evidence that firms design their executive compensation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012974274
This paper develops an agency model to analyze the optimality of executive stock option compensation in the presence of … compensation, the relative size of manipulation-to-effort does not depend on the size of option compensation. Furthermore, an … optimal executive compensation package includes stock options instead of restricted stocks under most circumstances. Testable …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012857493
costly executive incentive compensation to sustain firm productivity and increase shareholder wealth …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013251641
This paper examines why powerful CEOs are paid more in total compensation. Broadly, our results are consistent with the …, this additional compensation is a premium for her superior ability. Third, we find that a founder-CEO prefers employment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012999536