This paper studies leverage dynamics when managers cannot commit to future financing and default policies ex-ante. Managers derive private benefits of control but debt constrains their flexibility, and thus, they build up less excessive leverage and may even actively reduce debt over time....

This study examines managerial compensation incentives and its impact on firm's financial decisions. Specifically, we examine how CEO's inside-debt based compensation incentives (pension benefits and other deffered compensation) influences firm's debt maturity structure. We examine this...

Capital structure decisions rely on a complex array of theoretical foundations and practical considerations. At the managerial level, it is impractical to base decisions purely on theory. While one can develop a perception of an optimal capital structure, the decision is often obscured by...

This study examines the integration of corporate social responsibility (CSR) criteria in executive compensation, a relatively recent practice in corporate governance. We construct a novel database of CSR contracting and document that CSR contracting has become more prevalent over time. We...

This study examines the relationship between corporate managers' political ideology and corporate leverage policies conditional on investor sentiment. Based on a minimum of 21,884 observations over the 1992-2008 period, the authors show that Republican managers significantly reduce leverage...

The purpose of this study is to examine the moderating effect of corporate governance on the relationship between capital structure and firm performance. This study uses secondary data in the form of financial reports at the end of 2019 from micro-financial institutions (rural banks) with a...