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In this Article we submit that the compensation structures at banks before the financial crisis were not necessarily flawed and that recent reforms in this area largely reflect already existing best practices. In Part I we review recent empirical studies on corporate governance and executive pay...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013132545
Key points:• This article considers how the recent market turmoil affected national banking systems, thereby prompting state measures;• It describes the remuneration problems shown by the financial crisis: rewards for failure; short-term behaviour; inappropriate design of performance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013136173
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The paper outlines the developments in the EU regulatory framework for executive remuneration since 2004 and going through the financial crisis. It also presents the results of an analysis of the remuneration practices adopted by the largest European listed firms before and after the crisis,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013073163
In this chapter, we analyse current trends in the regulation and practice of executive remuneration. No doubt, the role of regulation in this area is on the rise, particularly after the recent financial crisis, and the standards as to pay governance and structures are spreading from the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013045689
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Bank executives' compensation has been widely identified as a culprit in the Global Financial Crisis, and reform of banker pay is high on the public policy agenda. While Congress targeted its reforms primarily at bankers' equity-based pay incentives, empirical research fails to show any...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013095013
We investigate the effect of managerial incentives and market power on bank risk-taking for a sample of 212 large US bank holding companies over 1997-2004 (i.e. 1,534 observations). Bank managers have incentives to prefer less risk while bank shareholders have preference for ‘excessive' risk....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013133995
We investigate the effects of managerial incentives and market power on bank risk-taking for a sample of 212 large U.S. bank holding companies over the period 1997-2004 (comprising 1,534 observations). Bank managers have incentives to prefer less risk, while bank shareholders prefer higher risk,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013092614