This study examines the effects of CEO global reputation on cross-border M&A performances. Based on the CEO's Twitter accounts, we hand-collect the information about the CEO’s followers to measure their global reputation. We find that CEOs with better global reputations improve cross-border...

We study the role of Western CEO incentives in fostering the technological rise of China. Due to China's quid pro quo policy, foreign multinationals face a trade-off between the short-term benefits of accessing China's vast market and the long-term costs of transferring technology to China....

This paper examines whether the systemic risk of financial institutions is associated with the risk-taking incentives generated by executive compensation. We measure managerial risk-taking incentives with the sensitivities of chief executive officer (CEO) and chief financial officer (CFO)...

The large compensation received by bank executives is among the many factors blamed for the risk-taking that led to the 2008-2009 financial crisis. We test whether and how pay disparities between CEO and non-CEO executives—the so-called CEO pay gap—influenced risk taking at publicly traded...

This paper analyzes how ownership concentration and managerial incentives influences bank risk for a large sample of US banks over the period 1997-2007. Using 2SLS simultaneous equations models, we show that ownership concentration has a positive total effect on bank risk. This is the result of...

This paper examines the effect of accounting conservatism on firm-level investment during the 2007-2008 global financial crisis. Using a differences-in-differences design, we find that firms with less conservative financial reporting experienced a sharper decline in investment activity following...

Using 256 TARP recipients, I find that markets negatively react to the news on limiting executive compensations. Although investors react quite positively for the initial announcement of TARP on October 14, 2008, other announcements regarding compensation regulation including a strict $500,000...

This paper investigates (1) how the composition of executive compensation is related to a bank's incentive to take excessive risk, (2) whether executive compensation in larger banks, especially the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) banks, induces more severe moral hazard behavior, and (3) how the relation...

The aim of this paper is to examine the executive compensation practices in closely-held financial institutions where the corporate governance conflict lies between the blockholder on one hand and minority shareholders and depositors on the other. We study the determinants of the level of bank's...

Existing literature offers opposing views on the effects of financial crises on firm innovation. We provide evidence supporting the Schumpeter’s view of the creative destruction of crises. We identify one specific channel, the internal compensation mechanism that firms use to motivate managers...