Agency theory argues that pay-performance sensitivity should be negatively associated with risk. Yet, empirical studies have reported mixed findings on this relationship, which may be attributable to such confounding factors as different levels of delegation and monitoring costs. Extending prior...

This study reports that changes in compensation from performance-sensitive (commission-based) to less performance-sensitive (base salary plus commission) schemes hurt employee performance but do not impair the company's. We analyzed performance data for 4,392 employees and 87 branches of a major...

Family owners and foreign institutional investors have played a vital role in shaping the development of corporate compensation practices in Asian emerging markets. However, family owners and foreign institutional investors may differ in their use of incentive plans for top management as a...

We investigate whether managerial risk aversion, as measured by CEO political ideology, affects corporate decisions to undertake earnings management. Using a sample of 10,799 firm-year observations for S&P 1500 firms during the period from 1996 to 2008, we document that Republican CEOs, who tend...

This study examines how manager's power affects capital expenditure in conglomerates, and how the firm's corporate governance mitigates the influence of subsidiary managers' informal power on capital expenditure. We conducted an empirical study using Taiwanese Business Group data, which includes...