This study presents a review of theoretical concepts described in the literature that explain how corporate events might be perceived by investors. The theoretical discussion in this paper is related to three corporate events: CEO turnovers, dividend payouts, and block trades. The objective of...

Despite developments of recent theoretical and numerous empirical studies on the policies effectively adopted by companies, the dividend distribution policy (DDP) remains largely unexplained. In this regard, the main purpose of the current study is to empirically examine the effects of both CEO...

We use hand-collected board data around the issuance of two distinct government-led board structure mandates in the U.K. to establish the effect of outside directors on acquirer performance. Increases in outside director representation are associated with better acquirer returns in deals...

We adopt a novel approach to explain why firms opt for or against CEO duality and the value implications of this choice. Exploiting the 2009 amendments to Regulation S-K, we provide unique evidence on the first-time disclosure of the reasons firms state for combining (separating) the roles of...

We investigate corporate governance experts' claim that it is detrimental to a firm to reappoint former CEOs as directors after they step down as CEOs. We find that more successful and more powerful former CEOs are more likely to be reappointed to the board multiple times after they step down as...

To gain insights about the quality of boards' firing decisions, we investigate abnormal stock returns and operating performance around CEO-turnover announcements in a new hand-collected sample of 208 "clean'' turnover events between January 1998 and June 2009. Unlike the majority of previous...

To gain insights about the quality of board's firing decisions, we investigate abnormal stock returns and operating performance around CEO-turnover announcements in a new hand-collected sample of 208 "clean" turnover events between January 1998 and June 2009. Unlike the majority of previous...

CEOs of S&P 500 firms that report high non-GAAP earnings relative to GAAP earnings receive more than $600 thousand in unexplained pay. The abnormally high pay appears even after controlling for the level of non-GAAP earnings and despite relatively weak GAAP performance and low returns....

We study the role of trading, and in particular market making, for the provision of stock-based incentives to managers. Market making provides liquidity as it allows trading on private information about the value of the firm. But in a liquid market the stock price does not react much to the...