This paper reports on the “CEO's-eye-view” of the 1990 commercial real estate crisis at Citibank using unique data from CEO John Reed's private archives. This qualitative analysis sheds light on questions that have perennially plagued executives and intrigued scholars: How do organizations...

Research on the nature and value of firms’ dynamic capabilities has produced contradictory propositions and findings. Scholars have argued that contingency theorizing has the potential to improve our understanding, as the context in which dynamic capabilities are deployed may affect their...

This paper examines the human network of entrepreneurs, and demonstrates the secrets of effective top management teams. More specifically, among entrepreneurs, founders in particular are dynamic by nature and familiar with their own business. However, some lack good skills in marketing and...

Building on prior research (Phillips et al. 2010), we make explicit the implied assumptions – both managerialist and determinist – in stakeholder research. We argue that three elements – managerial discretion, stakeholder orientation and nexus rent – interact in important and...

We begin by elaborating on the building blocks for understanding the dynamic interrelationships between stakeholder theory, managerial discretion and stakeholder orientation. We then provide a sketch of the dynamic between managerial discretion and stakeholder orientation and their likely...

Companies that are going to thrive must have a soul. Those that are only concerned with “maximizing shareholder wealth” or “maximizing profit” will find themselves going the way Enron went. CEOs will have to lead the revolution and should be the ones exhorting executives to make...

The agency problem at the core of corporate law stems from a chronic potential conflict of interest between directors' self-interest and that of shareholders. Corporate law views directors' self-interest in terms of diverting welfare to directors at the expense of shareholders. Another component...

Governance at banks, especially major banks, requires further reform, especially with respect to incentives. Supervisors are concerned that incentives may make executives prone to take “excessive” risks. Shareholders are concerned that banks rarely earn their cost of capital.What's needed is...

We are no longer an industrial economy characterized by assembly lines; we are now in a knowledge economy where creativity is what matters and the old ways of running a firm simply do not work. Using the value of the stock as a way of measuring CEO performance makes no sense and can actually...