Aim/purpose - Higher compensation and increased share ownership are believed to drive fewer earnings management. Therefore, the study examines the moderating impact of share ownership on the relationship between executive compensation and earnings management of listed Deposit Money Banks in...

This study examines the association between chief executive officer (CEO) overconfidence and future stock price crash risk. Overconfident managers overestimate the returns to their investment projects and misperceive negative net present value (NPV) projects as value creating. They also tend to...

This paper empirically investigates whether executive compensation has any impact on the IPO pricing. Corporate governance issues including the CEO's compensation are critical to the firm at the time of the IPO as many firms establish a formal separation of ownership and control for the first...

This paper finds that CEO stock options influence the choice, amount, and timing of funds distributed as a buyback. These results favor a managerial opportunism motive for buybacks over other theories and support two key research expectations - that buybacks impose option-induced agency costs on...

In listed companies, the Board of directors has ultimate responsibility for information disclosure. The conventional wisdom is that director independence is an essential factor in improving the quality of that disclosure. In a sense, this approach subordinates expertise to independence. We argue...

We examine the effect of IFRS on the use of accounting-based performance measures for evaluating and rewarding managers. We show that post-IFRS firms decrease the weight of Earnings-per-Share (EPS) based performance measures in CEO pay contracts. We provide indications that IFRS add “noise”...

We examine whether UK managers exploited the discretion provided in the UK GAAP to IFRS reconciliation process to manage earnings and whether this earnings management is associated with the structure of the managers' compensation contracts. Using a comprehensive dataset, mainly hand-collected...

This paper provides new evidence on the effect of compensation consultants on CEO pay. We show that the use of a compensation consultant has an increasing effect on the level of total CEO compensation, which is consistent with the “ratcheting up” effect of consultants on CEO pay argued by...

This study investigates whether firms revise executive bonus compensation targets based on past performance. Studies in this area suffer from a lack of detailed information related to executive performance targets. Using mandatory disclosures of executive compensation information under the U.S....

We offer evidence that the use of Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE) in CEOs' incentive contracts influences the effect of risk-taking incentives on both the magnitude and composition of firm risk. We find that when the incentive design lacks RPE features, the incentive portfolio vega...