One-in-five U.S. high-technology firms are led by CEOs with hands-on innovation experience as inventors. Firms led by “Inventor CEOs” are associated with higher quality innovation, especially when the CEO is a high-impact inventor. During an Inventor CEO's tenure, firms file a greater number...

An unprecedented number of firms announced CEO salary reductions at the onset of the coronavirus pandemic, which we argue was triggered by an exogenous increase in stakeholder outrage toward executive pay. We document that the overall compensation of these CEOs did not meaningfully decrease...

We investigate whether external industry tournament incentives influence the design of executive compensation contracts. Using staggered negative mobility shocks as exogenous disruptions to tournament incentives, we show that firms treated by these shocks act to restore their executives’...

Can better firm ESG policies be attributed to a CEO’s style? We find that firms led by CEOs with not-for-profit sector work experience (socially engaged CEOs) possess better ESG ratings and superior real ESG outcomes. They receive higher satisfaction ratings from their employees, develop more...

We examine whether improved governance helps to channel firms with powerful CEOs towards more value enhancing investment policies. We use the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and NYSE/NASDAQ listing rules as a quasi-exogenous shock and focus on firms that were required to improve governance. We find that,...

Do firms tailor compensation contracts to fit CEOs' individual behavioral traits, and if so, how? We explore this by focusing on CEOs' early life exposure to 'extreme fatality' disasters. Prior literature shows that this can drive agency conflicts of risk aversion. We hypothesize and show that...