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The Value of Interlocking Directorates in Vertical Contracting

Battaggion, Maria Rosa; Cerasi, Vittoria; Karakoç, Gülen - 2021

This study analyzes the choice to interlock between two competing companies when their privately known marginal costs are correlated. The two rivals are organized into different business models: one delegates its production to a subcontractor, while the other is vertically integrated and carries...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013213918

Managing Relational Contracts

Troya-Martinez, Marta - 2018

Relational contracts are typically modeled as being between a principal and an agent, such as a firm owner and a supplier. Yet in a variety of organizations relationships are overseen by an intermediary such as a manager. Such arrangements open the door for collusion between the manager and the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012937239

Optimal long-term contracting with learning

He, Zhiguo; Wei, Bin; Yu, Jianfeng; Gao, Feng - 2016

rent due to the persistent belief manipulation effect. We characterize the optimal contract using the dynamic programming … technique in which information rent is the unique state variable. In the optimal contract, the optimal effort is front …-loaded and decreases stochastically over time. Furthermore, the optimal contract exhibits an option-like feature in that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011557712

Optimal contracts under interpersonal projection

Morita, Kimiyuki; Muramoto, Akitoshi; Sogo, Takeharu - In: Games and economic behavior 150 (2025), pp. 356-364

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015426414

Financial contracts for CEO

Maisondieu-Laforge, Olivier; Kim, Yong H.; Kim, Young S. - In: Institutional approach to global corporate governance : …, (pp. 187-206). 2008

When corporate governance is effective, new managerial contracts should maximize shareholder wealth. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1993 provides a natural environment to examine the effectiveness of corporate governance. We find that firms affected by OBRAs $1 million cap on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015383164

Fixed salary or incentive contract? : the effect of stickiness of compensation contracts

Wakabayashi, Toshiaki - In: Asia-Pacific journal of accounting & economics : … 29 (2022) 1, pp. 179-190

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012820867

CEO employment contract horizon and financial reporting discretion

Gong, Guojin; Wang, Juan; Lee, Hyun Jung - In: Journal of management accounting research : JMAR 33 (2021) 2, pp. 75-108

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012626507

Incentives, Termination Payments, and CEO Contracting

Gillan, Stuart - 2017

Many executives have compensation that is potentially forfeit conditioned on the circumstances surrounding their departure from the firm. We study firms' endogenous decisions to use such compensation "holdbacks" as a bonding device and find that firms with higher executive replacement costs,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012958840

CEO Contractual Protection and Managerial Short-Termism

Chen, Xia - 2015

How to address managerial short-termism is an important issue for companies, regulators, and researchers. We examine the effect of CEO contractual protection, in the form of employment agreements and severance pay agreements, on managerial short-termism. We find that firms with CEO contractual...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013029214

Executing Contracts in Japan

Pardieck, Andrew - 2015

Executing a contract in Japan commonly involves a step or steps that are foreign to those working in other … jurisdictions. The first is affixing a personal or company seal to the contract in order to execute it. The second is payment of a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013014529