This paper investigates (1) how the composition of executive compensation is related to a bank's incentive to take excessive risk, (2) whether executive compensation in larger banks, especially the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) banks, induces more severe moral hazard behavior, and (3) how the relation...

The aim of this paper is to examine the executive compensation practices in closely-held financial institutions where the corporate governance conflict lies between the blockholder on one hand and minority shareholders and depositors on the other. We study the determinants of the level of bank's...

The large compensation received by bank executives is among the many factors blamed for the risk-taking that led to the 2008-2009 financial crisis. We test whether and how pay disparities between CEO and non-CEO executives—the so-called CEO pay gap—influenced risk taking at publicly traded...

This paper explores the relationship between board director compensation and bank performance for the period 1999–2021, considering the US banking system. The literature in this area with reference to financial companies and banks is poorly developed and leads to mixed results. Furthermore,...

This paper analyzes how ownership concentration and managerial incentives influences bank risk for a large sample of US banks over the period 1997-2007. Using 2SLS simultaneous equations models, we show that ownership concentration has a positive total effect on bank risk. This is the result of...

We argue that incentives to take equity risk ("equity incentives") only partially capture incentives to take asset risk ("asset incentives"). This is because leverage, while central to the theory of risk shifting, is not explicitly considered by equity incentives. Employing measures of asset...

Independent directors are appointed to represent the interests of mutual fund shareholders. Yet, being in the employment of fund–families, the fulfilment of fiduciary duties of independent directors may be compromised. Using a large, hand-collected dataset of over 10,000 U.S. mutual funds, we...

Using 256 TARP recipients, I find that markets negatively react to the news on limiting executive compensations. Although investors react quite positively for the initial announcement of TARP on October 14, 2008, other announcements regarding compensation regulation including a strict $500,000...

Existing literature offers opposing views on the effects of financial crises on firm innovation. We provide evidence supporting the Schumpeter’s view of the creative destruction of crises. We identify one specific channel, the internal compensation mechanism that firms use to motivate managers...

In this paper we examine the role of the CFO in setting risk management strategy with respect to macroeconomic risk, in particular, and we consider the information requirements for setting a strategy that is consistent with corporate objectives. We argue that macroeconomic risk management...