In this paper, we test empirically whether there is a relationship between corporate income taxes and CEO bonus payments. Using Compustat and ExecuComp data from 1992 to 2010, we find mixed results. Looking at the whole sample, the average bonus contract rewards tax savings excessively in...

This paper examines the relation between CEO inside debt holdings (pension benefits and deferred compensation) and corporate tax sheltering. Because inside debt holdings are generally unsecured and unfunded liabilities of the firm, CEOs are exposed to risk similar to that faced by outside...

This paper examines the relation between CEO inside debt holdings (pension benefits and deferred compensation) and corporate tax sheltering. Because inside debt holdings are generally unsecured and unfunded liabilities of the firm, CEOs are exposed to risk similar to that faced by outside...

Much empirical evidence is consistent with properly incentivized executives engaging in more tax avoidance. However, other studies provide evidence consistent with tax avoidance facilitating managerial rent extraction. We address these mixed results by reexamining the negative relation between...

We examine the effect of CEO narcissism on an especially aggressive form of corporate tax avoidance: tax sheltering. Narcissism is a multifaceted personality trait associated with a sense of superiority and a propensity to engage in questionable behavior. Narcissists feel that they are above the...

In this paper, we test empirically whether there is a relationship between corporate income taxes and CEO bonus payments. Using Compustat and ExecuComp data from 1992 to 2010, we find mixed results. Looking at the whole sample, the average bonus contract rewards tax savings excessively in...

We investigate how shareholder-and-debtholder conflicts of interest affect corporate tax avoidance using a unique setting of the affiliated and unaffiliated commercial bankers’ board representation. We find that appointing affiliated banker directors, but not unaffiliated banker directors,...

We use the unique nature of the director and officer liability protection law applicable to Nevada-incorporated firms to study how liability protection is related to corporate tax avoidance. We find that firms incorporated in Nevada avoid 32 percent more federal corporate tax as a fraction of...

CEOs with substantial short-term monetary incentives behave myopically out of concerns for the stock price. One potential target for managerial myopia is corporate tax avoidance. We show that, ceteris paribus, CEO short-term monetary incentives are associated with declines in cash effective tax...

A strictly risk-averse manager makes joint decisions on a firm's tax payments and book profit declarations according to accounting standards. It is analysed how the incentives to overpay or evade taxes and to inflate book profits are influenced by (1) the composition of the manager's...