We administer psychometric tests to senior executives to obtain evidence on their underlying psychological traits and attitudes. We find US CEOs differ significantly from non-US CEOs in terms of their underlying attitudes. In addition, we find that CEOs are significantly more optimistic and...

There is a widespread belief among observers that a lower premium is paid when the target CEO is retained by the acquirer in a private equity deal because the CEO's potential conflicts of interest leads her to negotiate less aggressively on behalf of the target shareholders. Our empirical...

This paper investigates the effect of superstar CEOs on their competitors. Exploiting shocks to CEO status due to prestigious media awards, we document a significant positive stock market performance of competitors of superstar CEOs subsequent to the award. The effect is more pronounced for...

In this Article we submit that the compensation structures at banks before the financial crisis were not necessarily flawed and that recent reforms in this area largely reflect already existing best practices. In Part I we review recent empirical studies on corporate governance and executive pay...

We investigate the financial result of boards' choices to promote a new CEO from within the firm or hire externally, at large U.S. public firms between 1986 and 2005. This choice theoretically maximizes profits. Additionally, choosing a new CEO from outside the firm influences labor market...

We simultaneously analyze two mechanisms of the managerial labor market (CEO turnover and remuneration schemes) in two different regulatory regimes, namely before and after the sweeping governance reforms adopted in the UK in the 1990s. We employ sample selection models to examine firms in a...

Key points:• This article considers how the recent market turmoil affected national banking systems, thereby prompting state measures;• It describes the remuneration problems shown by the financial crisis: rewards for failure; short-term behaviour; inappropriate design of performance...

This paper examines the economic consequences for firms that hire CEOs who have a reputation for being turnaround specialists. Abnormal returns around announcements that turnaround specialists have been hired as CEOs are significantly positive and more than 6 percentage points larger than the...

The results of this paper add significant contributions to the earlier findings that investigated various incentives to CEO's, contingent on future returns. This paper chooses a long time horizon, and revisits the challenges of aligning CEO Compensation with Performance and Shareholders' best...

We use data on the employment histories of CEOs to examine the relation between the CEO's labor-market mobility and the CEO-firm match. Mobile CEOs match with firms that exhibit poor performance, face revenue shocks, and offer risk-sensitive compensation. At these firms, mobile CEOs increase...