We derive a simple formula for the cost of the ESO to the firm at the grant date under the assumption that the executive has a constant market-to-strike multiple. The market-to-strike multiple is defined as the ratio of the market price on exercise to the strike price of the ESO. The expected...

This paper derives continuous-time conditions for a manager compensated with a call option to increase risk-taking. We show that the principles proposed by Ross (2004) in a one-period environment remain valid in continuous time

We introduce a theoretical model of executives with insider information who receive executive stock options (ESOs) as incentives and optimize their “outside wealth” portfolios. We show that insider information nullifies ESO incentivizing, misaligning executives' and shareholders' interests....

To value non-transferable non-hedgeable (NTNH) contingent claims and price executive stock options (ESOs), we use a replication argument to translate portfolios with NTNH derivatives into portfolios of primary assets (only) with stochastic portfolio constraints. By identifying stochastic...

I consider the problem of portfolio optimization for a manager whose compensation is given by the sum of a constant and a variable term. The constant term is a fixed percentage of the managed funds that is payed to the manager independently of his performance. The variable term is a premium that...

This paper solves the dynamic investment problem of a risk averse agent compensated with a performance related bonus plus a salary guaranteed up to a certain level of underperformance. The main contribution is to explicitly take into account the financial fragility of the principal [employer],...

This paper examines the incentives from stock options for loss-averse employees subject to probability weighting. Employing the certainty equivalence principle, I built on insights from Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) to derive a continuous time model to value options from the perspective of a...

This paper analyzes which stock option scheme best aligns the interests of a firm's manager and shareholders when both are risk-averse. We consider granting to the manager a basic fixed salary and one of the following four options: European, Parisian, Asian and American options. Choosing the...

The usage of performance-vesting (p-v) equity awards to top executives in large U.S. companies has grown from 20 to 70 percent from 1998 to 2012. We measure the effects of p-v provisions on value, delta, and vega of equity-based compensation. We find large differences in the value of p-v awards...