This paper derives continuous-time conditions for a manager compensated with a call option to increase risk-taking. We show that the principles proposed by Ross (2004) in a one-period environment remain valid in continuous time

We derive a simple formula for the cost of the ESO to the firm at the grant date under the assumption that the executive has a constant market-to-strike multiple. The market-to-strike multiple is defined as the ratio of the market price on exercise to the strike price of the ESO. The expected...

We introduce a theoretical model of executives with insider information who receive executive stock options (ESOs) as incentives and optimize their “outside wealth” portfolios. We show that insider information nullifies ESO incentivizing, misaligning executives' and shareholders' interests....

To value non-transferable non-hedgeable (NTNH) contingent claims and price executive stock options (ESOs), we use a replication argument to translate portfolios with NTNH derivatives into portfolios of primary assets (only) with stochastic portfolio constraints. By identifying stochastic...

This paper solves the dynamic investment problem of a risk averse agent compensated with a performance related bonus plus a salary guaranteed up to a certain level of underperformance. The main contribution is to explicitly take into account the financial fragility of the principal [employer],...

This paper examines the incentives from stock options for loss-averse employees subject to probability weighting. Employing the certainty equivalence principle, I built on insights from Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) to derive a continuous time model to value options from the perspective of a...

This paper analyzes which stock option scheme best aligns the interests of a firm's manager and shareholders when both are risk-averse. We consider granting to the manager a basic fixed salary and one of the following four options: European, Parisian, Asian and American options. Choosing the...

Using data that includes specific contractual details of Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE) contracts granted to executives for 1,833 firms for the period 1998 to 2012, we develop new methods to characterize RPE awards and measure their value and incentive properties. The frequency in the use...

We examine the informed trading in the options market for firms announcing CEO turnover and their suppliers and find that pre-announcement options trading in both announcing firms and the suppliers have predictive power for abnormal returns around forced CEO turnover events. This effect is...