How can office-seeking politicians or managers be aligned with social welfare or firm welfare, given that such agents have a suboptimal incentive to cater to majority preferences in situations with low participation costs and to elite preferences in situations with high participation costs? In...

I examine the reputation and regulatory effects on the directors' turnover and their directorships when firms are accused of fraudulent financial reporting (FR). The results show that the directors at FR firms incur reputation costs from abnormal turnover in relation to the directors at non-FR...

This paper studies the effects of interlocked boards of directors on voluntary disclosures, governance practices and earnings quality. The Canadian environment, where director interlocks are prevalent, is examined. A checklist of twenty voluntary disclosure measures from proxy statements is...

Research Question/Issue: The existing literature documents the possibility that investors may consider female Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) less valuable investment targets due to the prejudice against women. This study examines Female CEOs' contributions to company value in the stock market,...

This paper investigates the effects of managerial mergers and acquisitions related investment strategies on the exit risk of firms. Using a sample of hyperactive bidders, I show that managerial excessive acquisitiveness can precipitate firm exit. Overbidding is associated with weak corporate...

Directors' remuneration is a key issue for both academics and policymakers. It has caused enormous controversy in recent years. This study uses a comprehensive index to analyse the disclosure of directors' remuneration in Italian and UK listed firms. It finds that the level of voluntary...

Boards of directors play their role in corporate governance by advising and/or monitoring managers. In the corporate disclosure literature, prior research has documented directors' monitoring role, yet empirical evidence on directors' advising role is limited. Since the advising role often...

In this paper, I investigate the interaction between the duration of executive compensation and shareholder governance. I show that short-term compensation can elicit shareholder intervention and thus enhance firm value. The central mechanism is that the use of short-term incentives enables...

Recent corporate governance scandals have been attributed to lack of board independence and the influence CEOs have over their boards. However, CEOs can also affect board efficacy without compromising independence by choosing directors strategically. We offer a theoretical framework using a...

Prior turnover literature documents that poor performance leads a board of directors to terminate the CEO, but does not explore the underlying causes of the CEO's poor performance. Recognizing that terminated CEOs have often been successful earlier in their tenure, we conjecture that changes in...