The value a director provides to a firm is empirically hard to establish. We estimate that value by exploiting the commonality in idiosyncratic returns of firms linked by a director and show that, on average, a single director's influence causes variation in firm value of almost 1% per year. The...

(Formerly, Do Non-Executive Employees Have Private Information That is Relevant to Outside Investors?)This paper examines the participation decisions of employees in a stock option exchange program aimed at restoring value to underwater options. The program invites employees to exchange their...

A unified framework is presented to characterise the capital structure of firms that face borrowing restrictions - which extends the classic theory of capital by incorporating elements from actuarial and agency theory. It is demonstrated that the bankruptcy and agency costs afforded by these...

We study the relations between governance mechanisms (internal and external), conference call voluntary disclosures (incidence and length), and CEO compensation using hand-collected data on conference calls, corporate governance, and compensation. We hypothesize and show that institutions push...

Since the late 1990s, the number of apologies being offered by CEOs of large companies has exploded. Communication and management scholars have analyzed whether and why some of these apologies are more effective or more ethical than others. Most of these analyses, however, have remained at the...

We study the relations between governance mechanisms (internal and external), conference call voluntary disclosures (incidence and length), and CEO compensation using hand-collected data on conference calls, corporate governance, and compensation. We hypothesize and show that institutions push...

Until October 2004 corporate insiders in Germany were required to report trades in the shares of their firm "without delay". In practice substantial reporting delays were common. We show that the delays are systematically related to the characteristics of the firm. Delays are longer in...

In studies of corporate governance by default, information asymmetry is assumed, based on the principle-agent theory, between investors and executives, and also by default it is assumed that executives have superior information over investors. In this paper I apply the more rich theory of...

Departing from previous studies, this paper investigates the impact of corporate board diversity on corporate performance and executive pay within the context of MENA countries. Our sample includes a balanced panel of 600 firm-year observations, consisting of 100 individual firms drawn from 5...

Managerial compensation theory proposes that both equity- and debt-type compensation should be included in the optimal compensation contract in order to align managers' interests with those of both shareholders and debtholders of the firm. However, this reasoning also suggests that the two forms...