If overstatements were a symptom of the agency conflict, pay-for-performance sensitivities should have increased in response to the additional penalties for misreporting imposed by SOX. Our finding of their decrease is inconsistent with the view that overstatements were an unintended consequence...

This paper investigates whether individual top executives have incremental effects on their firms' tax avoidance that cannot be explained by characteristics of the firm. To identify executive effects on firms' effective tax rates, we construct a dataset that tracks the movement of 908 executives...

Early empirical studies find a negative association between firm performance and shareholder activism, whereas more recent studies document a positive association. We argue and theoretically show that this change in behavior results from mandating executive compensation disclosure. We develop a...

We investigate if high-ability managers are more likely to intentionally smooth earnings, a form of earnings management, and when they are more likely to do so. Although prior studies provide evidence that high-ability managers report higher quality earnings, the literature does not indicate...

The paper examines the relationship between share ownership by boards of British stock exchange listed companies and accrual based earnings management. It provides the first empirical evidence that the relationship is impacted by UK Company Law and the institutional governance framework.We...

This study examines the sensitivity of CEO compensation to fair value gains and losses in derivatives for firms in the U.S. oil and gas industry. Our evidence indicates that firms use derivatives for both hedging and non-hedging purposes and that the derivative gains have a substantial impact on...

We examine whether firms in industries with greater labor mobility exhibit less myopic behavior. Using an occupation-based measure of labor mobility for a large sample of US firms, we show that greater labor mobility is associated with fewer myopic operating decisions. This association is...

We examine a model that incorporates two hidden-actions of the manager: a productive effort and a manipulative effort. The manager is paid a bonus based on the accounting report that the manager can manipulate. A downward restatement of the accounting report triggers lawsuits. The manager is...

Managerial behavior differs considerably when managers report quarterly profits versus losses. When they report profits, managers seek to just meet or slightly beat analyst estimates. When they report losses, managers do not attempt to meet or slightly beat analyst estimates. Instead, managers...

Managers in their terminal years have an incentive to manipulate earnings to enhance earnings based bonuses. We examine this horizon problem by considering the role of the compensation committee in setting terminal-year compensation. We predict that compensation committees are aware of the...