Using a sample of more than 1,500 US public firms in the period 1998-2016, we examine how firms endogenously adjust CEO compensation contracts when they become financially distressed. The link between compensation and equity-based measures of firm performance is positive and strong prior to...

Recent studies suggest that CEO debt-like incentives, such as defined benefit pensions and deferred compensation ("inside debt"), improve financial reporting quality, a finding that has implications for policymaking and the design of executive compensation contracts. We challenge this finding on...

The founding directors of newly incorporated companies bring social capital (reputation, networks, business relationships) and human capital (task-related, professional and director experience) to a new venture and founding boards vary in degree of heterogeneity (size, diversity, turnover). This...

This paper studies whether banks charge higher or lower interest rates on loans to firms with overconfident CEOs. It establishes a theoretical model to show the relationship between the loan rate and overconfidence of the borrowing firm's CEO. It also conducts empirical analyses to test the...

This paper studies whether banks charge higher or lower interest rates on loans to firms with overconfident CEOs. It establishes a theoretical model to show the relationship between the loan rate and overconfidence of the borrowing firm's CEO. It also conducts empirical analyses to test the...

We examine the disclosure level in remuneration package of Executive Directors (EDs), by taking a case study of Tata Motors Limited, India's largest automobile company, on three occasions and the effect of shareholder activism on the disclosure level of the same. The first one is the proposal of...

We examine how CEO's inside-debt based compensation incentives (pension benefits and other deferred compensation) influence firm's debt maturity structure. We examine this relationship in the context of the hypothesis that CEO's inside-debt based incentives exposes managers to similar kind of...

In this study, we examine whether the initiation of credit default swaps affects the reference entity's executive compensation design. With both human capital and financial capital highly associated with the firm's bankruptcy risk, risk averse managers prefer cash compensation over option...

This paper examines the use of key employee retention and incentive plans (KERPs) in bankrupt firms. We find that firms in Chapter 11 are more likely to offer KERPs when firms are located in thicker employment markets, when creditors have strong control, and when bankrupt firms have complex...

Using a hand-collected executive pension database, we study how both CEO and non-CEO executive compensation structures affect the overall risk of a firm. We accomplish three major objectives: (i) we provide a significant extension of the Sundaram and Yermack (2007) research framework by...