Governance at banks, especially major banks, requires further reform, especially with respect to incentives. Supervisors are concerned that incentives may make executives prone to take “excessive” risks. Shareholders are concerned that banks rarely earn their cost of capital.What's needed is...

This article examines the relationship between CEO characteristics and firm performance with a sample formed by the best performing CEOs in the world according to Harvard Business Review. The empirical analysis is based on descriptive statistics techniques and studies the universe of CEOs...

Little is known about why CEOs voluntarily purchase shares of their firm other than because they expect to directly profit from doing so. However, since CEOs are risk-averse, highly un-diversified, and face litigation costs from trading on favorable private information, direct profits are...

This paper describes the conflict that is typical in a family business and highlights some of the major factors that make family business conflict unique from other types of interpersonal conflict in the workplace. Failure to adequately control conflict in family business may contribute to the...

The agency problem at the core of corporate law stems from a chronic potential conflict of interest between directors' self-interest and that of shareholders. Corporate law views directors' self-interest in terms of diverting welfare to directors at the expense of shareholders. Another component...

Can better firm ESG policies be attributed to a CEO’s style? We find that firms led by CEOs with not-for-profit sector work experience (socially engaged CEOs) possess better ESG ratings and superior real ESG outcomes. They receive higher satisfaction ratings from their employees, develop more...

If overstatements were a symptom of the agency conflict, pay-for-performance sensitivities should have increased in response to the additional penalties for misreporting imposed by SOX. Our finding of their decrease is inconsistent with the view that overstatements were an unintended consequence...

CEO social activism is increasingly common, but little is known about the motivations and the economic consequences. In this paper, I show that CEO social activism is linked to political polarisation in the US. Social activism is concentrated in states with higher within state political...

We analyze the effects of CEOs' layoff risk on their risk choice while overseeing a firm. A CEO, whose managerial ability is unknown, is fired if her expected ability is below average. Her risk choice changes the informativeness of output and market's belief about her ability. She can decrease...

This paper investigates and compares the characteristics of independent directors and supervisory board members in Chinese listed firms. The occupational backgrounds of independent directors and supervisory board members in listed firms are very different. Besides, different firms have different...