We use the exposure of U.S. firms’ directors to the staggered introduction of sustainability disclosure reforms in foreign countries to study the role of the board of directors in shaping corporate sustainability. Using a difference-in-differences design, we document that the board has a...

I examine the reputation and regulatory effects on the directors' turnover and their directorships when firms are accused of fraudulent financial reporting (FR). The results show that the directors at FR firms incur reputation costs from abnormal turnover in relation to the directors at non-FR...

In 2001, Nevada significantly limited the personal legal liability of corporate officers and directors. We use this exogenous shock to implement a differences-in-differences design that examines the impact of officer and director litigation risk on agency costs. We find decreased firm value,...

This paper empirically investigates whether executive compensation has any impact on the IPO pricing. Corporate governance issues including the CEO's compensation are critical to the firm at the time of the IPO as many firms establish a formal separation of ownership and control for the first...

This study examines how globalization of corporate governance practices influence the risk of European CEOs being dismissed. We argue that the harsh monitoring of the American corporate governance system spills over to the rest of the world as a result of this globalization. We focus on direct...

This study examines globalization of monitoring practices by focusing on how American (U.S.) influences on European firms impact the dismissal risk for these firms' CEOs. Specifically, we argue that the stronger short term orientation of the American corporate governance system increase the...

This study examines globalization of monitoring practices by focusing on how American (U.S.) influences on European firms impact the dismissal risk for these firms' CEOs. Specifically, we argue that the stronger short term orientation of the American corporate governance system increase the...

We study the effect of CEO external-directorships on performance using non-US firms. We find that CEOs serving on four or more external-directorships have a detrimental effect on firm value and performance and more powerful CEOs are busier. Firms with busy CEOs trade at a 10% discount relative...

China has moved rapidly from a socialist planned economy to a market economy. As a result, many enterprises in China are seeking talented top management to increase their performance and decrease their default risk. Studies abound regarding top management turnover and its relationship with firm...

This study investigates CEO turnover and corporate performance relationship as a measure of the effectiveness of a corporate governance system. The impact of different financial accounting regimes on the turnover/performance relationship is also analyzed. If systems replace poorly performing...