Financial restatements are costly, but frequent, events and many firms restate several times. This paper asks why rational managers engage in misreporting, in spite of the costly consequences. We present a simple extension to the Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) model, which provides testable...

We experimentally study the deception detection capabilities of experienced auditors, using CEO narratives from earnings conference calls as case materials. We randomly assign narratives of fraud and non-fraud companies to auditors as well as the presence versus absence of an instruction...

We insert an automated high-quality (HQ) auditor into established experimental audit markets to test the impact on the supply and demand for audit quality. Our approach allows us to investigate manager demand for audit quality and how other auditors respond to the increased competition from the...

We examine the spillover effect of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) international inspection program on improving the contracting role of accounting numbers in executive compensations in an international setting. For a sample of non-U.S.-listed foreign public firms with...

In this study, I summarize the current state of executive compensation, discuss measurement and incentive issues, document recent trends in executive pay in both U.S. and international firms, and analyze the evolution of executive pay over the past century. Most recent analyses of executive...

This research explores the use of control rhetoric in CEO letters between the pre and post Sarbanes Oxley periods and examines financial statement users' perception of internal controls and company performance from the CEO letter. We compare the amount of control rhetoric included in CEO letters...

This study investigates how the disclosure of management compensation contracts affects executive behavior by modeling a situation in which both the principal-agent relationship and market interactions are important. We find that making the disclosure of these contracts mandatory creates...

Even though financial reporting primarily falls within the scope of the CFO responsibilities, there is considerable evidence for the CEO's influence on corporate misreporting. Regulatory initiatives such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 have therefore increased the CEO's responsibility in the...

We document the emergence of “social executives,” top executives who connect with investors directly, personally, and in real time through social media, and we study the consequences of this development for financial markets. We contend that the emergence of social executives enables...

This paper examines whether analysts and investors efficiently incorporate the informational cues from managerial linguistic complexity (e.g. Fog) on conference calls into their forecasts and trading decisions. We predict that managers use linguistic complexity to obfuscate before poor future...