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Mandatory CEO Non-Duality, Agency Risk, and Shareholder Value
Guimarães, Rinaldo; Trevisan, Giuseppe - 2022
disclosure of the regulation indicates that the most suggestive mechanism is shareholders’ sentiment of managerial agency risk …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013405872
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CEO Tenure and Risk-Taking
Chen, Dong - 2014
This paper conducts a systematic analysis of the effect of CEO tenure on risk-taking. We document an overall positive … relation between tenure and risk-taking. The results are inconsistent with viewing tenure primarily as an indicator of human … and recent theoretical work, we show that the effect of CEO tenure on risk-taking depends on the information asymmetry …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013066261
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Country‐, Firm‐ and Director‐level Risk and Responsibilities and Independent Director Compensation
Melis, Andrea; Rombi, Luigi - 2021
independent director‐level risk and responsibilities are related to independent director compensation, in terms of amount and …‐level agency account for the variation of independent director compensation amount. Firm‐level ESG‐related reputational risk and … director liability regulations, a firm’s ESG‐related reputational risk and the specific responsibilities on the board are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013230690
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Board Composition, Grey Directors and Corporate Failure in the UK
Hsu, Hwa-Hsien - 2014
This study examines the effect of board composition on the likelihood of corporate failure in the UK. We consider both independent and non-independent (grey) non-executive directors (NEDs) to enhance our understanding of the impact of NEDs' personal or economic ties with the firm and its...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013070406
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How (if any) Uniform Corporate Governance Measures Matter for Executive Compensation Practice at Closely-Held Banks
Slomka-Golebiowska, Agnieszka - 2013
The aim of this paper is to examine the executive compensation practices in closely-held financial institutions where the corporate governance conflict lies between the blockholder on one hand and minority shareholders and depositors on the other. We study the determinants of the level of bank's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013075367
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The structure of banker's pay
Bennett, Benjamin; Gopalan, Radhakrishnan; Vorkink, Keith; … - 2016
While executive compensation is often blamed for the excessive risk taking by banks, little is known about the … price. Performance targets for bankers are not related to the risk of the bank, and ROE targets are not appropriately … adjusted for leverage. Consequently, the design of executive compensation in banking may encourage both high leverage and risk …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011962226
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The wells Fargo cross-selling scandal
Tayan, Brian - 2016
In this updated Closer Look, we examine the tensions between corporate culture, financial incentives, and employee conduct as illustrated by the Wells Fargo cross-selling scandal. In 2016, Wells Fargo admitted that employees had opened as many as 2 million accounts without customer authorization...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011865024
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The Long Shadow beyond Lockdown : Board Chairs’ Professional Epidemic Experience and Corporate Investment
He, Shan - 2020
Based on the evidence after the outbreak of SARS in 2003, which is caused by the same family of viruses as COVID-19, we show that due to the “probability weighting” phenomenon, i.e., decision makers tend to overweight the probability of extreme tail events, the epidemic experience induces...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012827060
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Shareholder Incentive Alignment and CEO Turnover : The Case of Split-Share Structure Reforms in China
Usman, Muhammad - 2015
In this study we analyze the effect of split-share structure reforms on CEO turnover and performance relationship in Chinese listed firms. We use special dataset that manually categorizes a large number of CEO turnover events as either forced or non-forced. By employing logit regression and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013010860
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Managerial Power and CEO Compensation in Financially Distressed Firms
Guo, Sheng - 2014
We study the dynamics of managerial influence and Chief Executive Officers' (CEOs) compensation over the course of financial distress during 1992 to 2012. Using a matching estimator to identify suitable controls, we find that under distress firms reduce managerial board appointments, intensify...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013048928