Based on behavioral finance theory, we discuss the influence of managers' herd behavior on corporate financialization from the perspective of managers' behavioral preferences. Empirical testing was conducted using data from nonfinancial listed firms on the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares from...

This study examines the determinants of CEO compensation using data from a nationally representative sample of privately held U.S. corporations. We find that (i) the pay-size elasticity is much larger for privately held firms than for the publicly traded firms on which previous research has...

Suppose the value of a firm is endogenously determined by a manager's costly effort. We call this manager a distinguished player if he also can trade shares of the firm on a market. Arbitrage-free asset pricing theory suggests that the equilibrium market price reflects the value increasing...

This paper uses worldwide firm-level data to scrutinize the governance factors that favor gender diversity in leadership positions. Our results reveal that the gender of the dominant shareholder is key. The chief executive of firms with a female dominant shareholder has a significantly higher...

This paper deals with approving the effect of both a governance system and individual cognitive and emotional features in the financial analysis of a firms’ innovation decision. After discussing the theoretical linking between ownership concentration and the CEO’s attitude and behavior, we...

We analyse the combined effects of bargaining power, managerial ability/effort, and risk-taking strategies on the choice of hedge fund (HF) incentive contracts, and hedge fund performance. In our model, the HF manager and outside investors first negotiate over the type of contract (asymmetric or...

Previous literature shows that employee ownership can be used as a reward management tool or as entrenchment mechanism. This paper develop a model suggesting that employee ownership policy reveals management quality. Good managers would use employee ownership as a reward management tool whereas...

We find a significant hump-shaped relation between firm valuation and CEO ownership when external governance (EG) is weak, but the relation is insignificant when EG is strong. These interactive effects are identified while controlling for firm-fixed effects. The results imply that CEO ownership...

Executive compensation in the U.S. banking industry has been criticized as a root cause of the recent financial crisis. This study examines the relationship between executive compensation, ownership structure, and firm performance for Chinese financial corporations during 2001-2009. The results...

We present empirical evidence that firms inflate earnings around seasoned equity offerings in the presence of large outsider blockholdings, but not in their absence. The finding is robust to several alternative explanations, including differences in firm characteristics, growth, performance, CEO...