There is significant debate about the usefulness of disclosing the relative pay of the CEO and the median employee (hereafter, pay ratio), as required under the yet-to-be implemented Section 953(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act in the United States. Using an experiment, we find that disclosing...

We examine overconfident CEO directors and find they attend more board meetings, are more likely to serve on the nominating or the compensation committee, have more independent directorships, and foster higher attendance rates on boards. Boards with overconfident directors are more likely to...

Using more than 30 million quarterly observations on investment funds, firms, and directors, we show that equity-ownership relationships between funds and directors comove when new firms appoint these directors. Funds follow directors from high operating performance and high valuation firms to...

We investigate an emerging pay-performance activism under a natural setting of performance-focused shareholder proposals rule (PSPs) (Rule 14a-8) established by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for top management compensation. We find that: (1) PSP sponsors successfully identify...

We examine the consequences of the highly anticipated and controversial Section 953(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act, which mandates companies to disclose the CEO-to-median employee pay ratio starting from 2018. We address endogeneity concerns by using a regression discontinuity design around the public...

This article investigates the causal factors underlying cornerstone investor (CI) participation in initial public offerings in China's offshore Hong Kong market. Prospectus-based declarations on such allocations suggest that CI undertakings offer strong certification effects. Entrepreneurs...

We address one of the cardinal puzzles of European corporate law: the lack of derivate share-holder suits. We explain this phenomenon on the basis of percentage limits which require share-holders to hold a minimum amount of shares in order to bring a lawsuit. We show that, under this legal...

We address one of the cardinal puzzles of European corporate law: the lack of derivate shareholder suits. We explain this phenomenon on the basis of percentage limits which require shareholders to hold a minimum amount of shares in order to bring a lawsuit. We show that, under this legal regime,...

We address one of the cardinal puzzles of European corporate law: the lack of derivate shareholder suits. We explain this phenomenon on the basis of percentage limits which require shareholders to hold a minimum amount of shares in order to bring a law suit. We show that, under this legal...