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We consider a two-stage principal-agent model with limited liability in which a CEO is employed as agent to gather information about suitable merger targets and to manage the merged corporation in case of an acquisition. Our results show that the CEO systematically recommends targets with low...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198514
We consider a two-stage principal-agent model with limited liability in which a CEO is employed as agent to gather information about suitable merger targets and to manage the merged corporation in case of an acquisition. Our results show that the CEO systematically recommends targets with low...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011430291
, target shareholders receive lower takeover premia while acquirer shareholders capture additional rents from target …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013039450
This paper shows that an acquirer's learning speed about target managerial entrenchment determines the effectiveness of hostile takeovers as disciplining devices. In a dynamic setting, an acquirer keeps collecting information about the degree of target managerial entrenchment and thereby learns...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014352304
We derive a measure that captures the extent to which common ownership shifts managers' incentives to internalize externalities. A key feature of the measure is that it allows for the possibility that not all investors are attentive to whether a manager's actions benefit the investor's overall...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012899520
We find that when more independent directors rank a directorship high, the firm-specific information content in a firm's stock price increases. Further, independent directors with high reputation incentives serve firms that voluntarily disclose more information and display lower crash risk. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012971075
This paper studies the role of voluntary disclosure in crowding out independent research about firm value. In the model, when inside firm owners make it easier for outside investors to obtain inexpensive biased information from the manager, then investors rely less on costly unbiased research....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012826268
We examine whether the equity incentive heterogeneity of the executive team engenders a positive externality by curtailing stock price crash risk. Supporting this prediction, we find a negative relation between the equity incentive heterogeneity of the executive team and stock price crash risk....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014254323
Using a sample of target firms that do not delist from the stock market after a majority takeover, we investigate the … on equity. However, we do not find a significant effect of CEO turnover on target stock returns in the post-takeover …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013003124
We examine the association between various takeover outcomes and bidding firm non-executive directors' (NEDs … find that NEDs' relative compensation is positively associated with the bidding firm's market reaction to the takeover …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012949238