This article investigates the impact that successful hostile and friendly takeovers have on the rates of top management change for U.K. target firms. The results shows that hostile takeovers are associated with a greater degree of both top executive and top team forced departure rates compared...

We examine the influence of auditors on mitigating corporate fraud in China, which is known to have weak legal enforcement, weak investor protection along with tight control of the media and labour unions. We find that firms with executives that have lower integrity, indicated by a greater...

The Split Share Structure Reform in China enables state shareholders of listed firms to trade their restricted shares. This renders the wealth of state shareholders more related to share price movements. We predict this reform will create remuneration arrangements that increase the relationship...

We examine the influence of auditors on corporate fraud in China. We find lower executive integrity firms are associated with higher propensity of regulatory enforcement actions against corporate fraud in the subsequent year. We then show that this effect is moderated by the issuance of modified...

We use institutional-related theories and a unique natural experiment that enables an exogenous test of the influence of controlling shareholders on managerial accountability to corporate fraud. In China, prior to the Split Share Structure Reform (SSSR), state shareholders held restricted shares...

We use institutional-related theories and a unique natural experiment that enables an exogenous test of the influence of controlling shareholders on managerial accountability to corporate fraud. In China, prior to the Split Share Structure Reform (SSSR), state shareholders held restricted shares...

We use institutional-related theories and a unique natural experiment that enables an exogenous test of the influence of controlling shareholders on managerial accountability to corporate fraud. In China, prior to the Split Share Structure Reform (SSSR), state shareholders held restricted shares...